the sources of the Somali conflict
droughts are not uncommon in the Horn of Africa, the decisive factors
which have transformed the current drought into a famine are essentially
political in nature. Somalia, which has been wracked by
civil war since the collapse of its central government in 1991, epitomises
this. In the following piece, Afyare A Elmi argues that it was
a combination of the struggle by local groups for power and resources,
colonial and foreign intervention and state repression which precipitated
ka guur, xumaan u guur
bannaan, xeraan galnee
from bad to worse
can we go, we are in prison
Gamuute, Somali writer and poet
the early 1990s when the Soviet Union
disintegrated many people expected that peace in a unipolar world would
prevail. Instead, many intra-state wars broke out in different parts
of the globe. Different factions, identity groups and regions challenged
existing states' monopoly over violence. As a result, a number of states
collapsed and many others to this day remain precipitously on the verge
of failing. Somalia,
Sierra Leone, Liberia,
the former Yugoslavia,
Congo and Cambodia are examples of states that
experienced total collapse. Many African countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan
are under extreme pressure from domestic and external forces. Many scholars
and some important political actors often characterise these conflicts
as identity-based civil wars.1
article discusses the causes of the Somali conflict. As I argued elsewhere,2
the main causes of the Somali conflict are competition for resources
and/or power, the colonial legacy, and repression by the military regime.
Politicised clan identity, availability of weapons, and the presence
of large numbers of unemployed youth are considered as contributing
causes.3 The article further outlines the peace processes held and it
discusses some of the main factors that led to the failure of these
Somalia: Brief background
European writers called Somalis a mixed race of Arab and African origins
but more reasonable accounts suggest that Somalis are related to other
ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa. In other words, Somalis, as an
ethnic group, are African in race and Muslim in faith. Moreover, Somalis
are largely homogeneous even though there are groups of Arabs, Bantus
and Baravans. Within the Somali ethnic group, there are many clans and
sub-clans that are based on patrilineal kinship.4
to European colonial arrival, Somalis did not have a central state in
the sense of a Western, Weberian bureaucratic state. However, they used
home-grown conflict resolution mechanisms of Heer (traditional law)
and Islam for resolving disputes among individuals and groups. Socioeconomically,
Somalis have depended on livestock and farming and many are pastoral-nomads.5
countries partitioned Somalia
into five parts. Great Britain
took two parts while France,
Italy and Ethiopia divided
the remaining three among themselves. In response to the partition and
the colonisation that followed, Somalis fought back. Sayid Mohamed Abdulle
Hassan led a long struggle against Great
Britain while several groups resisted France,
Italy and Ethiopia in other parts of Somalia. Besides
Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan's protracted struggle between 1899 and
1921, the most significant organisation was the Somali Youth League
(SYL), which was established in 1943.
Italy's defeat in the Second World War, the United
Nations put Southern Somalia into trusteeship
for 10 years. Northern and Southern Somalia
gained independence on 26 June 1960 and 1 July 1960 respectively, and
they united under one state. Somalia's
first state was determined to unite all the regions under 'Greater Somalia'.
the first nine years after its independence (1960-69), Somalia was a democratic state. Although
the SYL was the dominant political party, there were as many as 60 political
parties in the 1967 election.6 But, Cold War politics and the winds
of change in Africa affected Somalia.
The military coup on 21 October 1969 turned Somalia into a socialist state. Although
Siyad Barre's military regime built many schools and roads, it repressed
the Somali people for over 20 years. As a result of the military regime's
repressive tactics, several clan-based armed groups organised rebellions.
Among these were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somali
National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali
Democratic Movement (SDM) and the United Somali Congress (USC).
1978 military officers from the Majeerteen clan attempted to overthrow
the regime.7 In response the Siyad Barre government used the national
army and police to punish civilian members of the Majeerteen clan and
the military was involved in the killing of civilians, mass abuses,
and the destruction of areas inhabited by the clan. The current civil
war started with these events. As more clans began to challenge the
state, so the regime became more abusive. In 1981 politicians of the
Isaaq clan established an opposition movement (the Somali National Movement)
Again the Siyad Barre regime began to punish innocent civilians, murdering
many people when the SNM attacked the cities of Hargeysa and Bur'o in
1988. Human rights organisations reported that more than 50,000 people
were killed in these conflicts.8
Siyad Barre was overthrown in 1991, most of the country's institutions,
as well as law and order, were destroyed. Anarchy spread in the country.
While successful in overthrowing the regime, opposition factions failed
to fill the power vacuum because no faction (including the United Somali
Congress that expelled Siyad Barre from Mogadishu)
had the power to dominate the other groups militarily. They also failed
to reach a negotiated settlement. As a result, the factions kept fighting
against each other for different motives. Most of the major factions
have been fighting for domination, while smaller ones have been fighting
for resources and power
urban centres, different clans contest over resources such as water,
livestock and grazing land. In the past Somali nomads have fought over
the ownership of camels because of their utility for survival in Somalia's harsh environment. In this
context, clan identity is useful because to obtain and keep a large
number of camels one needs to rely on the support of one's clansmen.
As Abdalla Omar Mansur notes, after urbanisation, the type of assets
seen as important changed.10 State power, weapons, jobs and foreign
aid became important resources for which clans and other groups competed.
To access these, again one had to rely on the relationships that clan
identity provided. In relying on clan identity, clan lines were strengthened.
during the first round of the civil war, between 1988 and 1992, militias
were organised along major clan lines and major cities changed hands.11
In fact, it was at that time common to hear from the media, and Somalis,
that faction X had captured a particular city or was occupying an important
location within the capital. Militias from Hawiye clans expelled other
Somali clans from Mogadishu and other towns in the central and
southern regions. Militia groups that belonged to the Darod clan also
controlled the Lower Jubba and Puntland
regions while Digil and Mirifle took charge of the Bay and Bakool regions.
Soon this changed, and the sub-clans of the major clans began to compete
for the control of major cities. In Mogadishu,
Habar-Gidir and Abgal militias fought for four months and destroyed
what was left of the city. Habar-Gidir militias also fought against
the militias of Murusade and Hawadle clans. Similarly, the militias
of Absame and Harti clans of the Darod clan clashed a number of times
for control of Lower Jubba, particularly the city of Kismayo.
The Marehan and Harti sub-clans' forces have also fought over the same
issue. These examples were repeated as the militias of Digil and Mirifle
clans fought over control of the city of Baidoa.
Even the break-away region of Somaliland was not spared from this intra-clan
warfare - the militias of Isaaq clans (Garhajis and Habar Awal) fought
a bitter civil war in north 'Somaliland'.
legacy and military repression
the macro level the colonial legacy has also played a significant role
in the Somali conflict. In 1884, the colonial powers divided the Somali
peninsula into five different regions. Great
Britain took the northwest regions
and Northeast Frontier District (NFD). France colonised Djibouti
and Italy controlled
During the 'scramble for Africa', Ethiopia
was given the western portion of Somalia for its cooperation with the
colonial powers. After colonisation, Great
Britain handed over several regions of the Somali
territories to Ethiopia
and Kenya. Indeed,
it was because of this division that Somalis started to mobilise for
independence and fight against colonial forces. Moreover, after Somalia became independent in 1960 it spent most
of its resources regaining the lost regions.12 The current collapse
of the Somali state is rooted in the 1977 war between Somalia
over the 'Ogaden' region. Due to direct military intervention from the
Soviet Union and Cuba,
Somalia lost the
respect to repression, injustices that stemmed from the use and abuse
of power during the period of the Somali state (1960-91) produced many
of the grievances that Somalis have against each other. Both civilian
and military governments were essentially controlled by the elites of
respective clans who held the levers of state power. Somalis call the
first civilian government, as democratic as it was, 'the corrupt government'
(Dowladdii Musuqmaasuqa). Qasim, a famous Somali poet, eloquently characterised
how Somalia's civilian government failed
to meet the expectations of Somalis. He said, 'Isma doorin gaalkaan
diriyo, daarta kii galaye'13 (There is no difference between the infidel
I expelled [from the country] and the one that occupies the building
[the government parliament]). Although not widespread, there were cases
in which the government used the Somali police against clans who held
grievances against the regime.14
civilian leaders in the period between 1960 and 1969 embezzled state
resources, mishandled judicial cases and scholarships, or else used
nepotism when hiring and firing government employees, the military regime
which took power in 1969 committed heinous crimes against civilian populations.
The military leaders used brute force against opposition groups and
the general public. The first incident came when military officers attempted
to overthrow the government in 1978 (after the 1977 war). The coup failed,
and Siyad Barre's regime killed many innocent Somalis who belonged to
the Majeerteen clan in the Mudug and Bari regions. From the regime's perspective,
those people were guilty by association or because they shared an identity,
at times a distant one, with the officers allegedly responsible for
carrying out the coup. Hadrawi,
Somalia's greatest poet, protested
this barbaric act and wrote his poem 'Heelliyo' (Female monkey), in
which he criticised the military regime's practices.15
similar event, albeit bigger in terms of magnitude and human suffering,
occurred in northwest Somalia, 'Somaliland',
in 1988. After a long war Siyad Barre signed a deal with Ethiopia's dictator
in which they agreed to stop supporting the respective opposition groups
of both regimes. This agreement forced Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia to stop
supporting Somali opposition groups, including the Somali National Movement
(SNM). As a result, the SNM moved into Somalia,
captured Bur'o city and then attacked Hargeysa, the second capital of
Somalia. The Siyad
Barre regime retaliated, killing thousands of people with military airplanes
and tanks. Several human rights groups condemned this act and in fact,
even the United States,
which earlier supported the Siyad Barre regime, stopped providing military
assistance to the Somali government.16
pride and the culture of taking revenge against any member of the perpetrator's
clan (i.e., collective punishment) are not only causes of traditional
clan wars but the cause of the recent civil war. For some theorists,
pride or prestige is considered a type of resource, albeit not a quantifiable
one.17 There are numerous examples that show how clan pride motivated
conflicts. For example, when the militias of Abgal and Habar-Gidir sub-clans
of Hawiye fought in Mogadishu, it was clear
that clan pride was a pertinent factor. Members of the Abgal clans considered
Mogadishu as their own city
and believed that the Habar-Gidir clan came all the way from the central
regions of the country. Similarly, when Habar-Gidir's militia captured
the Hiran, Lower Shabelle and Bay regions,
clans that traditionally populated those areas internalised the defeat
as an injury to clan pride.18
pride causes conflicts between clans when a member of a clan kills another
person. The clan of the victim often takes such an act as an injury
to its pride and takes revenge. Besides competition for resources and/or
power, there are many examples where a war began between two clans because
of a perceived injury to clan pride and the collective punishment that
followed it. In the 1940s clan wars among the Habar Yonis, 'Ogaden'
and Dhulbahante clans began, and according to Guba poems, it was because
of perceived injury to clan pride.
Somali peace conferences: Why did they fail?
were five major conferences that the international community supported
(see table). However, at least 12 additional conferences were held,
all outside of Somalia and all
of which also failed. Djibouti
sponsored the first peace conference in August 1991 and the Arta peace
process in 2000. It also hosted two rounds of conferences in May and
June 2008 for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. Kenya hosted a
conference for the Somali groups in April 1994 and October 1996. Moreover,
in 2001 Kenya hosted
two more conferences, in Nairobi
and Nakuru. Some Somali groups met in Cairo
in November 1993. Yemen
held talks for the Somali groups in April 1997. This conference was
useful as it destroyed the green line in Mogadishu
between the United Somali Congress (USC) groups. Moreover, Yemen mediated
the two factions of the TFG in 2005. Ethiopia organised two conferences:
Sodere in 1996 and Awase in 2001. Sudan hosted three rounds of conferences
between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts.
factors contributed to the failure of the first two peace conferences
in Djibouti and Addis Ababa. Some of the faction leaders that
participated in the conferences thought they could win the war through
military victory and therefore were not interested in a negotiated settlement.
For instance, the six groups that met in Djibouti signed a peace accord, but
General Mohamed Farah Aideed rejected the deal even though his representatives
signed the agreement. He believed the agreement did not reflect the
realities on the ground. Right after the accord, war broke out between
the factions of General Aideed and Ali Mahdi over power-related issues.
thousands of people were killed during the Mogadishu
fighting between the USC groups and other inter-clan wars, none of the
groups emerged as a winner. The international community and the regional
actors called for another conference in Ethiopia.
The 15 factions that participated in this conference produced a detailed
peace agreement. The creation of a Transitional National Council was
agreed on which had to be elected from Somalia's
18 regions. Each of the regions would choose three members, of which
one would be a woman. Again, the question over who would select these
members resulted in a dispute between General Aideed and the leadership
of the United Nations. General Aideed believed that since he controlled
many regions his faction would nominate, while the UN wanted to respect
the local people's wishes. Again, General Aideed's forces fought against
the US-led United Nations forces, thus leading to another failure.
the first two conferences were unsuccessful due to the lack of will
on the part of Somali faction leaders, the Cairo
and the Arta conferences failed due to foreign meddling too. When Somalis
signed the Cairo Peace Accord, Ethiopia
convinced Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf and General Aden Abdullahi Nur (Gabyow)
to quit the conference. These leaders left Cairo
and rejected the outcome. Moreover, Hussein Aideed, Ali Mahdi and others
were also not interested in implementing the agreement. Hussein Aideed
refused to leave Baidoa which his forces controlled. In addition, Ali
Mahdi and Hussein Aideed failed to pacify Mogadishu.
Many Somalis believe they had neither the will nor the capacity to do
Mbagathi conference and Transitional Federal Government
the Mbagathi conference lasted for two years and the transitional government
that resulted officially ruled the country for the longest time, in-depth
analyses are warranted. The peace conference held for the Somali factions
and warlords in Kenya concluded
on 10 October 2004, with the formation of a transitional government.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organisation
of East African countries, sponsored the conference, which was hosted
by the Kenyan government. During this period, as IGAD claims, the Somali
factions enacted a transitional charter and selected a 275-member legislature.
The selected parliament then elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as president.
to Stedman, badly designed and poorly implemented peace agreements can
lead to a renewed civil war, not to peace. Stedman cites the examples
of Rwanda and Angola
where, according to him, more people died after a peace agreement was
signed than during the conflict.19 At the outset, there were serious
problems with the process that produced Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government. Ethiopia dominated the peace process.
In particular, it rewarded the warlords that supported its policies
by appointing them as members of the parliament and cabinet, and it
punished those who were not on its side: civil society, nationalist
intellectuals, and Islamists. Since representation problems have always
been the most difficult challenge, Ethiopia
and Kenya, with the
help of IGAD, arbitrarily selected most of the 275 members of the parliament.
They also alienated factions and countries that were important for any
successful peace agreement in Somalia.
Ethiopia and Kenya had their
own reasons for manipulating the peace conference. They had concerns
about the notion of a greater Somalia
since they both control Somali regions. So in this venture, they wanted
to install a regime that was opposed to the idea of a greater Somalia. Besides,
is a large landlocked country, and it is interested in gaining access
to a sea corridor. The current Addis Ababa
regime, therefore, wants to create several mini-states that are hostile
to each other and have good relations with Ethiopia.
It prefers to deal with different clans that populate the areas in which
it has an interest rather than dealing with a strong united Somali state.20
Ethiopia and Kenya imposed this transitional government on the
Somali people, and for the first time in history they had a charter,
a parliament and a government of their design in Somalia. Without a national debate
or referendum, Ethiopia
and Kenya, while using their proxy warlords, also forced
an undefined and obscure form of federalism on Somalia. Interestingly,
the argument here was that the state was not federal but the government
was federal - the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic.
This logic was strange because the confusion it created is still with
the new Government of National Unity.
conditions that often necessitate federation are not present in Somalia. In addition, Somalia lacks
the capacity to run several layers of government: local, regional and
federal. There are also practical problems, as currently there are no
agreed-upon regions or states in Somalia.
Depending on the popular opinion of different clans, some (federalist
northerners) want two regions while others (Puntland and Rahanweyn Resistance
Army) call for four or five regions. But there are also those, such
as some members of the Darod clan, who want the federation to be based
on the 18 regions that Siyad Barre left. On the other hand, some members
of the Hawiye clan call for the eight regions that existed before Siyad
Barre came to power. None of the above criteria are based on an objective
system or the economic reality of the country; each clan wants to maximise
its share. Adopting such an undefined form of federalism is likely to
lead to more conflicts, not solutions. More important, as has been noted
previously, the Somali people did not have an opportunity to participate
in the process that was used when adopting federalism.
the Somali peace process in Kenya
took two years, unfortunately it did not have time to address justice-related
issues. The question of how Somalis should deal with their past never
made it to the table because the warlords did not want to face up to
their crimes. Avoiding this important justice issue will not help solve
it. Blanket amnesty, punishment and lustration (i.e., limiting the political
rights of the warlords) are all possible ways of addressing the issue,
which has to be dealt with in the first place.
addition to these structural issues, the transitional government faced
external and domestic challenges. Externally, although Ethiopia
and Kenya were on
board, some countries in the region such as Eritrea
and Egypt were not
happy with the outcome of the conference in Kenya. As media reports suggest, Egypt received Abdullahi Yusuf coldly when he visited
Cairo in November 2004 to attend the
funeral of Yasir Arafat, indicating that Egypt was not interested in working
with his government. Arab countries and Somalia's
two neighbouring countries, Ethiopia
have always been rivals. Arab countries share a culture and religion
with the Somali people. Ethiopia
and Kenya, on the other hand, share geographical boundaries
and consider it a historic enemy. Kenya
and Ethiopia also
have political, economic and military ties against Somalia.21 Moreover,
Ethiopia undermined Egypt's
efforts to end the Somali conflict in 1997 at the Cairo conference.
Western countries did not clearly state how they would deal with the
new regime after it was established - although this changed in 2006
when the Union of Islamic Courts emerged. The US and Great Britain cautiously
welcomed the development, but their recognition and support were conditional
on how the new government functioned in the country - in fact, Washington
ignored the government and decided to work with the Mogadishu warlords
in undermining the government. These countries' past policies toward
Somalia did not change. When former
president Abdikassim Salad Hassan and his prime minister, Dr Ali Khalif
Galaidh, asked for assistance in 2000, the US and other Western countries told
the transitional national government they would receive assistance when
their government was fully functional in the country. Had the Western
political and economic support come right after the conclusion of the
conference, the survival chances of the Transitional Federal Government
would have been much better.
the TFG faced many challenges. After its inception the government broke
down into two factions in 2005. The president and the prime minister
were on one side, and the speaker and several Mogadishu
warlords were on the other. The president of Yemen mediated the two groups in 2005.
The parliamentary speaker and the president agreed to end their hostility
and hold a parliamentary meeting in Baidoa.22 But again, the transitional
government broke down into two groups. The parliamentary speaker and
40 other members fled the country after Ethiopian invasion forces crossed
the Somali border. The president and the prime minister and most of
the members of parliament went to Baidoa where they chose another speaker.
The difference between these two groups was largely based on the presence
of Ethiopian troops. Interestingly, there was another rift between the
president Abdullahi Yusuf and the new prime minister, Nur Hassan Hussein,
which escalated and resulted in the resignation of the president Yusuf.
Somalis did not own the process that produced the new charter, parliament
and the government, many Somalis were cautious in dealing with the transitional
government. Neither the Somali people nor their representatives have
elected the members of parliament; most members obtained their parliamentary
seats with the help of the countries managing the peace conference.
Many Somali grassroots groups such as civil society organisations, independent
media, human rights organisations and religious institutions were not
happy with the outcome of the conference. Many chose not to cooperate
with the regime while many more actively resisted both the Ethiopian
occupation and the installation of the transitional government it controlled.
Abdullahi Yusuf brought heavy political baggage with him. His style
of leadership, his attitude toward those who differed with him and his
loyalty to Ethiopia did not
sit well with many important sectors of Somali society whose support
was necessary for the success of his regime. These groups considered
him Ethiopia's determined
spoiler. In addition, the timing and the way he handled his first major
policy decisions - calling for peacemaking troops that included those
of Ethiopia and Kenya - was also controversial. These
actions fuelled mistrust among rival clans and Islamists because some
interpreted the moves as hostile. As different Somali media outlets
have reported, the price of weapons in Mogadishu dramatically increased
in the months that followed President Yusuf's election; a sign of war,
addition, Abdullahi Yusuf had poor relations with most of Somalia's intellectuals and religious
leaders. Yet the support of these groups was necessary for any government
to function in Somalia.
In the past, he alienated intellectuals and antagonised the religious
community, calling them 'terrorists' in order to win sympathy from the
Ethiopian government and Bush administration. Moreover, inviting Ethiopian
troops, although the US
was also involved in this project, was a serious blunder on the part
of the government. In fact, the transitional government did not recover
from this move.
short, the causes of the Somali conflict are multiple. I have argued
here that the main causes are competition for power and resources, colonial
legacy and state repression. Moreover, I discussed the roles of clan
identity and the clan pride that comes with it. Regarding the reasons
that led to failure of the efforts to end the Somali conflict, a combination
of factors including lack of will and capacity on the part of Somalis
and foreign meddling are behind the collapse of the five major peace
A Elmi is Assistant Professor in the International Affairs Department
at Qatar University.
The above is an extract (Chapter 2) from his book Understanding the
Conflagration (see advertisement on p. 40).
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily represent those of the Third World Network.
See Michael E. Brown, 'The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview',
in Michael E. Brown (ed.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 3-25; Chaim Kauffman, 'Possible and Impossible
Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', International Security 20 (1996): 136-75;
Dan Smith, 'Trends and Causes of Armed Conflicts', in M.F. Norbert Ropers,
Alexander Austin and Claus-Dieter Wild (eds.), The Berghof Handbook
for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive
Conflict Management, 2000), www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/smith_handbook.pdf
(accessed August 2008).
Afyare Elmi and Abdullahi Barise, 'The Somali Conflict: Root Causes,
Obstacles, and Peace-building Strategies', African Security Review 15,
no. 1 (2006): 32-54.
Dr. Abdullahi Barise and I have provided in-depth explanation on
the contributing causes and the obstacles in an article we published
in African Security Review, 15, no. 1 (2006): 32-54.
The major clans are Dir, Darod, Isaq, Hawaye, and Digil and Mirifle.
See I.M. Lewis, Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-based Society
(Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1998).
See I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society
(Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994).
A.A. Castagnio, 'Political Party System in Somalia',
1964; Lewis, Saints and Somalis.
Although this is the widely held view, the leaders and supporters
of this coup argue that the officers who wanted to overthrow the government
belonged to all clans, but the regime played politics with this and
punished only one clan.
A Government at War with Its Own People (London: Africa Watch, 1990),
See Elmi and Barise, 'The Somali Conflict'.
A. Mansur, 'The Nature of the Somali Clan System', in A.J. Ahmed (ed.),
The Invention of Somalia (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea
Press, 1995), pp. 117-33.
It would be simplistic to say that clan X fought clan Y over Z resources
because militias organising along clan lines used these clan names and
committed atrocities against civilian members of all clans. Although
most civilian members of clans did not play a notable part in the fighting,
the war nevertheless affected them. Here, I mean militias of respective
clans fought, not all the members of a clan against all members of another
clan. There are many examples where militias from two clans fought in
one part of the country, but the same two clans coexisted peacefully
in other areas.
Charles L. Geshekter, 'Anti-colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern
Horn of Africa before 1950', paper presented at Somali Studies Conference,
Boston, 1992; Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing
the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900 (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1982).
Ahmed Ismail Qasim is one of Somalia's most well-known poets. He
composed this poem during the 1960s.
See Elmi and Barise, 'The Somali Conflict'.
In the last few lines of this poem Hadrawi graphically explains the
atrocities that the military regime committed in the northeast and central
regions. In Somali, he writes, 'Hadimada Garoowiyo, hanaq go'a Nugaaleed,
halka aad tummaatiday, waxa kaga habboonaa, dar kaloo i hawlee, huqdaad
reebtay weynaa, hibashiyo ladh kululaa. Colka Bari harraatiyey, hubka
Mudug ku talax tegey, Allaylehe hubsiiniyo, hakin buu u baahnaa'. In
this poem, Hadrawi is talking about the troops that attacked the Bari
and Mudug regions of Somalia
and the atrocities they committed. For him, the Somali state cannot
be excused for such a crime. He concludes that the implication of such
a crime is huge.
See Africa Watch, Somalia.
See Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr, Using Conflict Theory (Cambridge:
Raage Ugaas, one of Somalia's classical poets, was quoted
as saying, 'Qab qab dhaafay baa, laba qabiil qaran ku waayaane. Qaabiilba
Haabiil markuu, qoonsaduu dilaye' (Two clans lose nationhood or brave
man because of clan pride. Qabil, the first son of Adam, killed Habil,
his younger brother, when he felt anguish).
See Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens,
Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002),
See Elmi and Barise, 'The Somali Conflict'.
Economic and Security Pact between Ethiopia and Kenya.
See the Aden Declaration for the details of the agreement between
Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan and Abdullahi Yusuf, www.hiiraan.com/news/2006/jan/eng/Aden_
Declaration.htm (last accessed February 2006).
World Resurgence No. 251/252, July/August 2011, pp 15-20